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APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO
PRAYER IN A PUBLIC UNIVERSITY
LOCKER ROOM:
AN ATHLETE'S AND COACH'S
PERSPECTIVE
GIL FRIED*
LISA BRADLEY
I. INTRODUCTION
Most athletes are familiar with the traditional pre-game prayers un-
dertaken prior to athletic contests. Most athletes participate in these
rituals without any thought as to the consequences or potential impact of
the prayers on their teammates. Athletes often participate in these pre-
game rituals out of habit or a sense of team unity. Others are forced to
participate due to threats of reduced playing time or other coercive acts.
An excellent example of the potential involvement of religion in the
locker room can be highlighted by events at the University of Colorado.
At the University of Colorado, football coach Bill McCartney was ac-
cused of publicizing his religious views and giving priority in hiring,
recruiting, and playing time to individuals sharing his religious attitude.'
While similar practices might have gone unchecked in the past, several
recent Supreme Court decisions have limited the days of blind indiffer-
ence to these rituals.
* Gil Fried, Esq. is the Director of the Sports Law Center, a division of Schachter, Kris-
toff, Orenstein, & Berkowitz of San Francisco, CA. Mr. Fried is an adjunct professor of sport
law at the University of San Francisco. Mr. Fried specializes in sports employment, facility
and participant rights. Lisa Bradley is an associate with Schachter, Kristoff, Orenstein &
Berkowitz in San Francisco, CA.
1. Peter Monaghan, Religion in a State-College Locker Room: Coach's Fervor raises
Church-State Issue, 31 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 3, 37, 38 (1985). It should be noted that even
though Mr. McCartney is a coach known for leading players in prayer, the practice has not
slowed substantially during his thirteen years with the University of Colorado. Legal observ-
ers felt that, "any hiring and recruiting practice that favored persons of a particular religious
bent would be vulnerable in a court of law, but they disagreed on the legality of prayer in state
college football programs." Id. The American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) stance was
that the injection of religion into a state-financed program violated the constitutional mandate
for a course of government neutrality toward religion. Id. See also, Peter Monaghan, U. of
Colorado Football Coach Accused of Using His Position to Promote His Religious Views, 39
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 12, November 11, 1992, A35, A37.
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Pre-game prayers are regularly held in public high school and univer-
sity locker rooms throughout the United States. These rituals are often
undertaken without any thought to possible legal consequences because
the coach, team, or school have never received any complaints from con-
cerned athletes or parents. However, the Supreme Court has recently
limited the various avenues by which prayers can enter into public
school activities.2
The First Amendment protects student-athletes by providing them
with certain safeguards against state endorsed adherence to a specific
religion, most often the coach's religion. This constitutional protection
must be balanced against the coach's right to effectively run his or her
team without having every word or action scrutinized. The conflict of
prayer in a public university locker room centers on the students' right to
be free from state imposed religious indoctrination and the coach's right
to free speech. This conflict can be examined through the eyes of the
First Amendment's Entanglement, Free Exercise and Free Speech
clauses.
Courts have yet to specifically address the topic of prayer in a public
university's locker room. Since there are no cases on point, this article
will attempt to present the possible legal arguments that would be
presented by the two sides of this debate. The players' interest in prac-
ticing their religion is weighed against a coach's right to motivate his/her
team. Both of these rights have to be examined in light of any action
undertaken or attributable to the state, and whether those actions consti-
tute endorsement of the prayers by the state. Based on the present state
of intercollegiate athletics, the student-athletes' right to be protected
from religious indoctrination by a coach supersedes a coach's free speech
right. However, voluntary, neutral moments of silence would neither
impinge on a student-athlete's rights nor curtail a coach's right to effec-
tively motivate his or her team.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT SCALE FROM PUBLIC SCHOOL PRAYER
THROUGH PRAYER OPENING LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS
Team prayer in a public university locker room can be looked at as a
morale booster and a tool to build team unity. Team prayer also re-
quires the application of the First Amendment to protect the rights of
student-athletes opposed to or uncomfortable with the prayer. Even if
student-athletes do not object to the prayers, the prayers can constitute a
2. See infra text accompanying notes 27-39.
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violation of the First Amendment. The First Amendment's Establish-
ment Clause "protects every individual's right to freedom of belief while
the Free Exercise Clause protects the individual's freedom to practice his
[or her] religion."'3 The Establishment Clause requires the state to be
"neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believ-
ers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no
more to be used so as to handicap religions then it is to favor them."'4
To help ensure a degree of separation between church and state, a
metaphoric wall has been created by the courts.5 While the wall used to
be solid and straight, it has over the years become "serpentine," with
some bricks having fallen or having been knocked out, leaving large
breaches.6 The amount of protection the wall actually affords to college
athletes can be demonstrated by analyzing an Establishment Clause case
law scale from elementary school prayer to prayer opening legislative
sessions cases. Falling in between these two ends of the continuum are
high school and college prayer cases.
In an absolute sense, some relation between state and religion is in-
evitable.7 The amount of permissible relations between government and
religion has been established by several major Supreme Court decisions.
The current standard used to judge Establishment Clause issues is the
Lemon test. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,' the Supreme Court struck down a
state salary supplement to non-public elementary school teachers be-
cause funds would flow from the state to parochial schools, which in-
volve substantial religious activity. In order to ensure neutrality, the
government would have to control the sectarian school programs.9 State
action passes the Lemon test if it has a secular legislative purpose. In
other words, the principal or primary effect of the law must neither ad-
vance nor inhibit religion. Additionally, the law must not foster exces-
sive government entanglement with religion.' 0
There have been several attempts to change the Lemon test, and the
Court has shown a predisposition over the past several years to adopting
a new standard. However, no new standard has been developed to re-
3. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1316, n.20 (D.C. N.J. 1977).
4. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
5. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445-46 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
6. THAYER S. WARSHAW, RELIGION, EDUCATION AND THE SUPREME COURT 12 (1979).
7. In fact the Court requires both accommodation and the exercise of benevolent neutral-
ity. Id. at 28, See also Lynch v. Donnely, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
8. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
9. Id. at 619-20.
10. Id. at 612-14.
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place the Lemon test.'1 Justices White, Scalia, and Rehnquist attacked
the Lemon test in County of Allegheny v. ACLU 2 as unduly limiting
government's involvement with religion, while Justice Kennedy argued
that the Establishment Clause is violated only if the state literally creates
a church or coerces religious participation. In contrast, Justices Black-
mun and O'Connor argued that governmental action is invalid if the ac-
tion symbolically endorses religion generally or a particular religion
specifically. 13
The Court's disposition in Establishment Clause cases was best ex-
pressed by the Allegheny Court when it indicated that:
In the course of adjudicating specific cases, [the Supreme Court]
has come to understand the Establishment Clause to mean that
government may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious
doctrine or organization, may not discriminate among persons on
the basis of their religious beliefs and practices, may not delegate
a governmental power to a religious institution, and may not in-
volve itself too deeply in such an institution's affairs.' 4
The hallmark of current analysis in Establishment Clause cases,
based on the Court's rationale in Allegheny, is the determination of the
degree of entanglement between the governmental unit and the religious
practice. Justice Blackmun's opinion in Allegheny set out the most logi-
cal approach to determine if there has been excessive entanglement be-
tween government and religious practices. This approach is the
"reasonable observer" standard.' 5 Using this approach, a reasonable ob-
server can examine whether an individual is forced into praying or if the
state acts in a manner that can be construed by the person being affected
as an endorsement of religion.16 Each Establishment Clause case hinges
on an analysis of the level of governmental involvement and the percep-
tion of governmental endorsement. By examining Establishment Clause
11. See generally County of Allegheny v. ACLU 492 U.S. 573 (1989), infra notes 12-15.
The Court in 1993 received another opportunity to overturn the Lemon Test, but failed to do
so. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,124 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1993).
Justice Antonio Scalia, a known Lemon critic, compared the test to a "ghoul in a late night
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly
killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frighten-
ing the little children and school attorneys...." Id. at 365. Justice Scalia went on to allege
that the other justices had "driven pencils through the creature's heart" (in previous deci-
sions), but had failed to bury it permanently. Id.
12. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 606-07, 659-660.
13. Id. at 620-21, 627-28.
14. Id. at 590-91.
15. Id. at 620.
16. Id.
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cases from elementary schools, high schools, colleges, and public institu-
tions, a scale can be established to help determine the amount of protec-
tion which would be afforded to student-athletes in a public university
setting. After analyzing the Establishment Clause scale, college athletes
might best be placed in between the rights of ordinary college students
and those of employees at public institutions.'7
A. Elementary School
Engel v. Vitale 8 is a perfect example of a case determining the
amount of interaction allowed between church and state in the context
of elementary school prayer. Engle involved a state law requiring the
recitation of a prayer in public school classrooms.' 9 The Supreme Court
struck down the state prayer by concluding that the prayer officially es-
tablishes a state religion, even though the prayer was neutral on its face
and recitation of the prayer was voluntary.2" The prayer violated the
Establishment Clause because the prestige and financial support of the
state were used to support a particular religion.2' The respondents, in-
tervenors, and the Board of Regents, as amicus curie, sought to distin-
guish the school payer based on "our spiritual heritage."' Nonetheless,
the Court concluded that the Establishment Clause did not indicate a
hostility towards religion or prayer, but the prayer in the Engle case in-
volved sponsorship of an unquestionable religious exercise, thus justify-
ing the elimination of the prayer, even if its elimination ran afoul with
"our spiritual heritage." 23
B. High School
The amount of government entanglement with religious exercise at
the high school level varies in different judicial districts. In Doe v. Al-
17. Analyzing prayer in a university locker room based on a scale of first amendment
decision is not a new theory. A similar analytical approach to solving the problem of religion
in the locker room was forwarded by R. Claire Guthrie, chairman of the continuing-legal-
education committee of the National Association of College and University Attorneys. Ms.
Guthrie stated that, "the question to ask should be where team prayers might fall along a
continuum between prayer in elementary and secondary schools and prayer before legislative
sessions in states or the U.S. Congress." Monaghan, supra note 2.
18. Engel, 370 U.S. at 421.
19. Id. at 422.
20. Id. at 430.
21. Id. at 431.
22. Id at 425.
23. Id. at 433-435.
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dine Independent School District,24 a Texas District Court held that the
school district's prayer violated the Establishment Clause. The court
held that the singing of prayers before athletic contests, pep rallies, and
graduation, occurred at extracurricular events, on school property and
the prayers were state-initiated, encouraged and supervised.' However,
in Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, a Michigan District Court up-
held similar prayers because the,
[P]roposed plans for graduation at high schools did not violate
establishment clause, where school districts were following long
tradition of including invocations and benedictions in their cere-
monies, had purpose of permitting students to plan or participate
in their own commencement exercise, graduation ceremony was
not mandatory part of school curriculum, speakers were other
than school employees, contested prayers took only a few min-
utes, were given only once a year, and reached different audience
each time, graduation was not part of educational program of
school, and there was no evidence that speakers intended to use
invocations and benedictions as opportunity to proselytize.2 6
A rash of graduation prayer cases exploded out of various courts
throughout the 1980's and early 1990's.27 The Supreme Court's action in
denying certiorari in the Jager v. Douglas County School District, case
helped reinforce the Lemon test and reduced the opportunities for
prayer before high school football games. In Jager, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that a constitutional challenge to the practice of giving invocations
prior to high school football games was not controlled by the Marsh v.
Chambers case, but rather by the Lemon test.29 The court felt that the
pre-game prayers had a religious purpose and the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion.30 Even though there was no entanglement visible on
the face of the invocation practice, the use of the school's sound system
24. Doe v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., 563 F. Supp. 883 (D.C. Tex. 1982). See also Lubbock
Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
25. Doe, 563 F. Supp. at 883-84.
26. Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 610 F. Supp. 43, 44 (D.C. Mich. 1985). See also
Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township Sch. Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Grossberg v.
Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (D.C. Va. 1974).
27. Some of the key cases in this regard include: Jones v. Clear Creek, 977 F.2d 963 (5th
Cir. 1992); Lee v. Weisman, 120 L.Ed. 467 (1992); Friedmann v. Sheldon Comm. Sch. Dist.,
995 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1993). See generally Henry J. Reske, Student-Led Prayers a Tough
Subject, A.B.A.J., November 1993, at 20. See also supra note 26.
28. Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, May 30,
1989 (88-1610).
29. Id. at 828. The Marsh case is discussed infra note 43 and accompanying text.
30. Id. at 829-31.
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and the event being a school sponsored event, at a school owned facility,
would convey a message that the school endorsed the religious
invocation.3'
Since Jager, the high school prayer debate has been readdressed by
the Supreme Court, as well as several lower courts.32 Two recent cases,
Lee v. Weisman and Jones v. Clear Creek33 , have clarified the constitu-
tionality of middle/high school graduation prayers. The Weisman case
involved the Supreme Court's first foray into the middle/high school
commencement and graduation cases. In a 5-4 majority the Court held
that a "religious exercise" at a middle school graduation was forbidden
by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.34 The case mir-
rored a typical high school graduation prayer case. A rabbi was invited
by a middle school principal to give an invocation and a benediction at
graduation exercises.35 Plaintiff's challenged the prayer, claiming the
prayer violated the First Amendment right to be free from state sponsor-
ship of religion.36 The Court struck down the prayer based on the fact
the school helped control the content of the prayer, the obligatory na-
ture of the ceremony, and the government involvement which was per-
vasive to the point of creating a state-sponsored and directed religious
exercise in a public school.37
The Court concluded that the constitution "forbids the state to exact
religious conformity from a student as the price of attending her own
high school graduation. ' 38 The Court's decision was based on law as
much as the understanding that societal and peer pressure combined
with the graduation tradition would create an environment where stu-
dents would not want to miss their graduation.39
In Jones v. Clear Creek, the Fifth Circuit upheld the constitutionality
of a school district resolution that allowed senior high school students to
vote on whether or not they wanted to allow student-led prayers at the
school's graduation.4" The difference between the Weisman and the
Jones case is the amount of governmental entanglement. In Weisman,
31. Id. at 831.
32. See generally supra note 28 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 28.
34. Weisman, 120 L Ed. 2d 467, 487.
35. Id. at 476.
36. Id. at 478.
37. Id. at 480.
38. Id. at 486.
39. Md at 484-5.
40. Jones, 977 F.2d at 971-2. See also Reske, supra note 27, citing, ACLU v. Blackhorse
Pike Regional Board of Education, No. 93-5368 (3d Cir. 1993), wherein the Third Circuit felt
1994]
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the school chose the prayer and the deliverer, while in Jones the students
made their own decision.
C. Colleges
Elementary and high school cases can be distinguished from Estab-
lishment Clause cases at the college level because of the maturity of the
student. College cases deal primarily with the development and imple-
mentation of religious activities by individual administrators or more
mature students. The Supreme Court concluded in Tilton v. Richardson
that the college student is more mature than other students and that col-
lege students are less impressionable and susceptible to religious
indoctrination.41
D. Public Institutions
In Marsh v. Chambers,4' the Supreme Court analyzed the constitu-
tionality of a paid legislative chaplain and prayers opening the start of
each Nebraska Legislature session. Former Chief Justice Burger con-
cluded that the practice of legislative and other bodies opening their ses-
sions with prayer is "deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this
country. '43 The difference between Marsh and the various school prayer
cases lies in the age of the person exposed to the religious message and
their perception of the religious activity. In Marsh the individual claim-
ing injury by the practice was an adult who was "presumably not readily
susceptible to religious indoctrination... or peer pressure."' It should
be understood, however, that the Marsh court reached its decision not
that delegating the decision to hold prayers to the students did not alter the fact that gradua-
tion was a school sponsored event.
41. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971). See also Roemer v. Board of Public
Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 750 (1976).
College students, as well as any other individuals, can face discrimination in a variety of
contexts which can include religious discrimination. One of the claims in Bath v. NAIA, 843
F.2d 1315, 1316 (10th Cir. 1988), was for a civil rights violation based on the practice of
pregame prayers at Mesa College. The claim was made under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. Section 2000d et seq., but the claim was not
decided because the prayer issue was non-justiciable. Id. at 1317.
42. Marsh, Nebraska State Treasurer v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). See also Bogen v.
Doty, 598 F.2d 1110 (1979); Marsa v. Wernik, 430 A.2d 888 (S.C. NJ 1981); Lincoln v. Page,
241 A.2d 799, 109 N.H. 30 (1968).
43. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783.
44. Id. at 792.
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by applying the Lemon test, but rather by analyzing the historical
grounds of prayer opening legislative sessions.'
The cases used to create an Establishment Clause scale of decisions
affecting schools and public institutions help expose several important
concerns. While the Supreme Court has taken several shots at the
Lemon test, it still is alive and the law of the land. Likewise, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the historical precedence of certain
prayers helps reinforce the validity of other prayers, especially before
mature audiences. Somewhere between governmental acquiescence and
attempted religious indoctrination lies the case of prayer in a public uni-
versity locker room.
E. Free Exercise Clause
Besides examining potential violations of the Establishment Clause,
it is also possible for a prayer in a university locker room to violate the
Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. In Engel, the Supreme
Court concluded that "indirect coercive pressure upon religious minori-
ties to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion" cannot be
constitutionally tolerated.46
An encompassing theme of the Religion Clause is protection of reli-
gious minorities from the religious majority no matter how much the
protection offends the majority.47 The Constitution states that religious
liberties are values that deserve a high degree of protection.48 Under the
Free Exercise clause students must be given the option of what religious
message they want to be exposed to without coercive pressure being sub-
tly applied. In the locker room, student-athletes might not have that
choice. If freedom of religion has any meaning, it is that people, espe-
cially religious minorities, have the right to practice their religion or be-
liefs without government interference. If locker room prayers force an
athlete to make a choice between their religion and the religion of the
state, then the Free Exercise Clause is violated.
45. Id. at 786. Historical grounds is often argued as a rationale for prayer at various levels
of public schools. See generally supra note 23 and 26.
46. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431. See generally The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
which limits the amount and extent of government involvement in burdening a person's exer-
cise of their religion. CQ US HR 1308.
47. The Court struck down the in-class reading of the Bible in Abington School District,
infra note 73. The Reverend Dr. Billy Graham declared the decision, "a penalty for the
'eighty percent [of Americans who] want Bible reading and prayers in school.' "LEO PFrrER,
GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION 210 (1975).
48. Warshaw, supra note 6, at 9.
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III. APPLYING THE SCALE TO STUDENT-ATHLETES
University students have been fighting for their constitutional rights
for years. Constitutional protections for university students have tradi-
tionally been minimal because the Supreme Court considered attend-
ance at a university a privilege, not a right; thus, students did not require
extensive constitutional protections.49 The Supreme Court in the pivotal
discrimination case of Brown v. Board of Education"° increased the
amount of constitutional protection afforded to all students by conclud-
ing that educational opportunity is not a privilege, but a right safe-
guarded by the Fourteenth Amendment. The advancement of students'
First Amendment rights was best expressed by Justice Powell in Healy v.
James, when he asserted that, "state colleges and universities are not en-
claves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.""1 However,
even with the advancement of the general student body's rights, one sec-
tion of the student body has lagged far behind. This group is made up of
what are perhaps the most rigidly controlled students on the campus-
student-athletes.52
Most college students live a life free of unusual burdens or controls
imposed by their colleges. Most students can choose which classes they
want to take, with whom they can associate, what time they will to go to
bed, when and what they can eat, and numerous other personal deci-
sions. College athletes on the other hand, especially in the major col-
legiate sports of football and basketball, often lack these fundamental
rights. Sports psychologist J. Scott observed;
[T]he athlete lives in a world where one misplaced word or action
often threatens the immediate end of his athletic career. From
Little League baseball through professional football, the correct
attitude is as important as actual athletic skill, and once an athlete
is labeled a troublemaker or uncoachable, his athletic career is
49. "Courts tended to look upon attendance at a public college or university as a privi-
lege, not a constitutional right from which it followed that the institution was to insist upon
whatever binding conditions of behavior it deemed appropriate." David Fellman, Religion, the
State, and the Public University, RELIGION AND THE STATE 303 (1975). See also Hamilton v.
Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Waugh v. Board of Trustees of
University of Mississippi, 237 U.S. 589 (1915); Steier v. New York State Education Comm'n,
271 F.2d 13 (2nd Cir. 1959).
50. Fellman, supra note 49, at 304, citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954).
51. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). See also Lansdale v. 'Tyler Junior College,
470 F.2d 659, 664 (5th Cir. 1972); Tinker v. Des Moines School District 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
52. Robert L. McGahey, Jr., A Comment on the First Amendment and the Scholar-Athlete,
6 HUM. RTs. Q. 155 (1976-77).
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usually doomed. For many years athletes perceived themselves as
being in a powerless position within the sports world, and like
most power-less groups they survived by deferring to authorities-
coaches, athletic directors, and professional team owners.53
A coach's authority over an athlete can extend to determining the
athlete's choice of degree programs or the type of person with whom the
athlete can associate. Athletes used to be unwilling to challenge a
coach's authority because they could have their scholarship revoked or
they could be "benched." The student-athlete's fear of retaliation helps
explain the relatively minimal number of grievances brought by student-
athletes.54
While the athletes as a group still defer to their coaches, cracks are
beginning to appear in coaches' armor. The 1993 collegiate sports sea-
son was a watershed year for athlete's rights. Student-athletes exerted
their strength and brought reform or changes to several programs. The
most notable of these occurrences include: Morgan State University
which canceled the last football game of the season when the players
threatened a halftime protest to demand the dismissal of the head coach;
the University of Maryland at College Park, where the men's soccer
team signed a petition asking for the removal of the head coach, who
resigned one week later; and football players at Memphis State Univer-
sity and Georgia Institute of Technology publicly clashed with their
coaches after suffering tough losses.5 5 As noted in one sports business
publication, "players are far less likely to bow to the authority of their
coaches than they might have a decade ago. '56
While some student-athletes have found the strength to exert their
rights, these students are normally the exception to the rule. Most stu-
dent-athletes defer to coaches because coaches are often their closest
associates, mentors, and teachers. A student-athlete may feel closer to a
coach than any other older person and they frequently seek parental
type assistance from that coach.57 The high pressured, win-at-all-cost,
53. Id. at 157, citing J. SCOTT, THE ATHLETIC REVOLUTION 66 (1971).
54. Id. See infra note 69-71 and accompanying text. The attorney in the Memphis State
locker room dispute commenting on why football players were reluctant to come forward
stated, "[lit is clear that personnel on athletic scholarships are not going to complain." Farrell,
Memphis State Coach is Accused of Imposing Religious Beliefs on Players, 29 THE CHRONICLE
OF HIGHER EDUCATION 6, 26 (1984).
55. Debra E. Blum, Series of Locker-Room Revolts Has Some Wondering About the Clout
of Athletes, 39 CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., February 10, 1993, 23, A35-36.
56. Rick Berg, Motivation or Abuse, ATHLETIC BUSINESS, June 1993, at 9.
57. Harry M. Cross, The College Athlete and the Institution, 38 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 150, 168-169 (1973). The fatherly/motherly position is often created due to the
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atmosphere of some athletic programs exerts tremendous pressure on
student-athletes, and their coaches are often their sounding board as
well as their emotional and psychological crutch.
To determine how much interaction is allowed between the univer-
sity and prayer, the university's support of the prayer has to be examined
along with the coach's rights, the need for governmental monitoring and
the potential impression created by the university endorsing the prayers.
Prayer in the locker room can be distinguished from the prayer re-
ferred to in the high school graduation cases because: college athletes
are normally required to participate, the coach is a school employee, the
same audience is addressed each time, a small controlled audience is in-
volved instead of a large crowd, the prayer is part of the official school
program and the result of the prayer can lead a reasonable observer to
conclude that the state is endorsing religion.58
As sports sociologist Jay Coakley concluded, religion's role in sport
sometimes seems to be targeted solely to the advancement of the reli-
gious values of a certain individual at the expense of others.59 A "no
pray/no play" rule is instituted by a coach to force acceptance of a cer-
tain belief or face repercussions including reduced or no playing time.
"No pray/no play" rules violate the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses because a student is forced to choose between his religion and
the coach's religion. "No pray/no play" rules are the simpler cases be-
cause there is direct pressure and coercion to violate one's religious be-
liefs. The more difficult cases are those of indirect pressure.
While a "no pray/no play" rule is clearly a First Amendment viola-
tion in a public university locker room, a non-religious moment of si-
lence represents a more acceptable position. Moments of silence can be
used to bring prayer into the locker room in a manner that might not
exert pressure on a student-athlete to choose between religion and non-
religion. Moments of silence are effective because coaches and other
athletes will not know whether the athlete used the silent moment for
prayer, inner reflection, or just relaxation.
Anything more than a voluntary moment of silence for inner reflec-
tion would require stricter adherence to the First Amendment, due to
the potential for peer pressure. Besides the coercive authority exercised
by a coach in endorsing prayer, the peer pressure put on the athletes to
student-athlete being away from his/her parents for the first time when they enter the pressure
filled environment of a university athletic program.
58. See generally Stein, supra note 26; Doe, supra note 25.
59. Jay J. Coakley, SPORT IN SOCIETY: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 288-289 (1982).
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be "team players" can deprive student-athletes of the choice of whether
or not to participate in the prayer. Being branded uncoachable by a
coach can be a difficult stigma to overcome, but an athlete that is not
considered a "team player" by his fellow athletes is often in a worse
position than someone that is considered uncoachable. Peer pressure
can generate a social stigma for those bucking the trend. Other athletes
might view non-compliance as an indication of a lack of willingness to
cooperate with other athletes on the field.
Even absent coercion by the state, the impact of peer pressure toler-
ated by the state can implicate the state.61 Peer pressure can be analo-
gized to being in a captive audience.6' The negative impressions of an
athlete's teammates can force an athlete into participating in prayers. In
analyzing the effect of prayers on adults in opening legislative sessions,
the court concluded in Marsh that an adult was "presumably not readily
susceptible to religious indoctrination.. .or peer pressure."'6 This view is
not uniformly accepted across the judicial bench. Justice Douglas stated
it best in his Engle concurrence when he concluded that if there was
coercion in the school prayer, then there would be coercion in the
prayers opening up Congress because few people would leave while
those prayers are going on. The audience is in a sense, a "captive" audi-
ence, because the stigma attached to leaving a prayer opening congress is
most likely severe.63 A greater stigma attaches to the very visible act of
leaving a locker room while one's teammates are united in prayer. A
college locker room and athletic team are normally smaller than a large
legislative assembly hall filled with hundreds of legislators. Thus, if a
student-athlete did not participate in a prayer, that fact would probably
be quite evident to everyone on the team.
Based on the First Amendment restrictions imposed on state actions
which tend to endorse and put the power and prestige of the state be-
hind religion, "no pray/no play" rules would be held unconstitutional.
Likewise, any active involvement by the state in locker room prayers will
sound the alarm of a First Amendment violation. Thus, the safest ap-
proach to allowing prayer in a locker room would be voluntary moments
of silence.
60. See generally Mergens, infra note 108. As indicated in Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635
F.2d 971, 978 (1980), an adolescent may perceive a voluntary school prayer in a different light
if he/she saw the teams football captain or other popular individuals on campus participating
in communal prayer meetings in the captive audience forum of a school.
61. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. See also Jager, 862 F.2d at 828.
62. Id
63. Engel, 370 U.S. at 442.
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IV. COACHES' RIGHTS
A public university is an agency of the state and the public university
employees, acting in their capacity as employees, are also agents of the
state.64 Thus, the actions of a coach, executing his or her job, are
equivalent to state action. Justice Douglas, in his Engle concurrence,
compared school prayer to prayer opening Congress each morning and
felt that both prayers would violate the Establishment Clause because in
each instance the person praying is a public official, on the public pay-
roll, performing a religious exercise in a governmental institution.65 A
public university athletic coach is traditionally a public official, on the
public payroll and a locker room is part of a government facility.66
Based on the involvement of a state employee at a state facility during a
state sponsored event, there is an over abundance of indicia demonstrat-
ing governmental entanglement with prayers in a public university's
locker room.
Nevertheless, a coach could argue that team unifying prayers are an
essential element required to effectively perform his/her coaching re-
sponsibilities. Some of the responsibilities of a coach include: the edu-
cating of his/her players in the playing rules and attendance penalties, to
promote the welfare of the sport in an honorable way, instilling in the
player a desire to win, and improving the player in the technique of the
sport.67
In Dunham v. Pulsifer, a case involving an unconstitutional athletic
grooming code, the Vermont District Court stressed the importance of
team discipline when it stated that:
The coach must be able to control within reasonable limits those
aspects of a player's behavior which relate to his performance as a
contributing member of the team... The coach's right to regulate
the lives of his team members does have limits, however. A coach
may not demand obedience to a rule which does not in some way
further other proper objectives of participation and performance.
It is bootstrap reasoning indeed to say that disobedience of any
rule weakens the coach's authority or shows a lack of desire on
64. Breen v. Runkel, 614 F. Supp. 355, 358 (D.C. Mich. 1985).
65. Engel, 370 U.S. at 441.
66. This assumption applies to both paid and volunteer coaches, as volunteer coaches are
still supervised by state actors the same as paid coaches or athletic administrators.
67. Cross, supra note 57, at 167. See also PHILLIP S. SLOAN, THE ATHLETE AND THE LAW
13 (1983); Omar S. Parker, The Authority of a College Coach: A Legal Analysis, 49 OR. L.
REv. 442, 449-50 (1970).
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the part of the competitor thus justifying disobedience to any rule
however arbitrary.68
One such arbitrary rule is a "no pray/no play" rule. At Memphis
State University, several football players alleged that the coaches were
not just espousing their personal belief, they were subtly (and not so
subtly), "attempting to convert the student-athletes to Christianity, to be
saved, to be part of the Born-Again movement."6 9 Ray Dempsey, the
football coach, held mandatory prayer meetings and, if the student-ath-
lete did not pray, he did not play.7° The ACLU was considering legal
action on behalf of the players until the university reprimanded the
coach for violating state educational rules on religious activity.71
Coaches often argue that team prayers help unite the team, which is
an essential task in a team sport such as football. The school district in
Doe contended that prayers served the clearly secular purpose of instil-
ling a sense of school spirit and pride in the students.72 The Doe court,
relying on Abington School District v. Schempp,73 found the school dis-
trict's purpose in conflict with the requirement of secular purpose be-
cause a state cannot seek to advance non-religious goals and values
through religious means.74 A coach should accomplish the goal of team
unity in a less intrusive manner, because the continuation of prayer im-
permissibly puts the power and prestige of the state behind a certain
religion. Team unity, team spirit, and team "psyching" can be accom-
plished through non-religious means, therefore a "no pray/no play" pol-
icy becomes an arbitrary rule that students should not have to follow.
Preaching might help instill team unity, but accomplishing team unity by
coercing a religious minority to undertake activities inconsistent with
that person's own belief is unconstitutional.
V. FREE SPEECH
Freedom of expression is a vital part of the educational process."
Thus, educational speech is afforded comprehensive First Amendment
68. Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 420 (D.C. Vt. 1970).
69. Farrell, supra note 54, at 26.
70. Id.
71. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 38.
72. Doe, 563 F. Supp. at 886.
73. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
74. Doe, 563 F. Supp. at 886. See also D. H. white, Annotation, What Constitutes
"Prayer" Under Federal Constitutional Prohibition of Prayer in Public Schools, 30 ALR 3d
1352, 1353 (1994).
75. McGahey, supra note 52, at 159.
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protection. On the whole, "neither the state in general, nor the univer-
sity in particular, is free to prohibit any kind of expression because it
does not like what is being said."'76 The state, however, can still regulate
certain speech if there is an overriding state interest,77 and the regulation
is reasonable.78
In the context of the Religious Clauses, the suppression of religious
speech is very limited. As the Supreme Court in Bender v. Williamsport
stated, "it is common ground that nothing in the Establishment Clause
requires the state to suppress a person's speech merely because the con-
tent of the speech is religious in character. '79 Nonetheless, universities
have censored religious speech in the past, based on Establishment
Clause concerns.80
The leading case involving student-athletes and the Establishment
Clause focuses on the permissibility of censoring political/religious
speech. The Williams v. Eaton series of cases involved a group of black
athletes that were dismissed from the University of Wyoming football
team following a dispute over the players' intentions to wear black arm-
bands during a game against Brigham Young University.81 The Tenth
Circuit concluded that the only reason for wearing the armbands was to
protest the religious views of the Mormon Church, and if the athletes
were allowed to display the armbands, their action would violate the Es-
tablishment Clause.82 The court further concluded that the university
trustees' decision was reasonable because there was strong support for a
policy restricting hostile expression against religious beliefs of others by
representatives of a state or its agencies.8 3
If courts are willing to go as far as to regulate student-athletes' ex-
pression as representatives of the state it would only seem reasonable
76. Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAN. L. Rnv. 5, 1027, 1039
(1969).
77. Id. at 1055.
78. Id. at 1043. See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
79. Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534,552 (1986). The dissent in
Widmar did not deny that speech about religion was protected by the First Amendment, how-
ever, they argued that "religious worship," in contrast to secular speech about religion, is not
speech generally protected by the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment. Widmar,
454 U.S. at 269, n. 6.
80. See Williams, infra note 81; Lynch, infra note 85.
81. Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Wyo. 1970), 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971),
333 F. Supp. 107 (D. Wyo. 1971), 468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1972).
82. Williams, 468 F.2d at 1081-84.
83. Id. at 1083. It is important to note the timing of the Williams case. The political
unrest and threat of student protest might have pressured the courts to expand the scope of a
university's ability to quell potential student unrest.
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that coaches, who are state employees, could also be regulated. The sup-
pression of a coach's religious speech that violates the Establishment
Clause has to be considered at least as reasonable as the logic used by
the university trustees to suppress the activities in Williams.'
Due to the position of authority occupied by a coach, few, if any,
student-athletes would try to disobey or argue with the coach's policy.
Thus, for a coach serving as a teacher, administrator, or preacher, the
collegiate locker room provides an unparalleled opportunity for the im-
position of religious values on a captive audience. Public university em-
ployees do not have a carte blanche right to impose religious values on a
captive audience. In Lynch v. Indiana State University, the Indiana
Court of Appeals held that a policy of a public university permitting a
teacher of a non-religious subject to introduce religious indoctrination
into the classroom is violative of its religious neutrality under the Estab-
lishment Clause." The court concluded that even though the reading of
the Bible was voluntary, there was still the element of coercion in light of
the supervisory position of control occupied by the instructor over stu-
dent grades and conduct.8 6 The plight of a student-athlete would be
more severe than that of a math student because the student-athlete nor-
mally spends several hours every day with a coach, instead of just one or
two hours every couple of days with a math instructor.
In addition to relying on judicial decisions, some states have been
successful in limiting a teacher or coach's religious speech through ordi-
nances. Such a statute was used by Memphis State University to limit
the religious speech of Coach Dempsey. The Tennessee Statute provides
for a period of silence in public schools "to prepare themselves for the
activities of the day."'  However, the statute further stated that, "noth-
ing contained in this section shall authorize any teacher or other school
authority to prescribe the form or content of any prayer."88
A coach could try to institute a prayer led by a student, priest, rabbi,
or by no one, however, the lack of a leader that can be associated with
the state does not, in itself, dismiss potential state action. The use of the
state owned locker room and state sponsorship of athletics provides a
84. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276. See also Breen, 614 F. Supp. at 359, where the court con-
cluded that rights under the Free Speech Clause may be limited by strictures that the Estab-
lishment Clause places on state institutions.
85. Lynch v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees, 378 N.E. 2d 900 (Ind. App.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1978).
86. Id. at 903.
87. TENN. CODE ANN. section 49-6-1004 (a) (1983).
88. TENN. CODE ANN. section 49-6-1004 (b) (1983).
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sufficient nexus to implicate the state.8 9 Voluntary participation in
prayers also does not provide the coach with a strong defense, because
even if a prayer is voluntary the state action of endorsing a specific reli-
gion is unconstitutional. 90
The problem with practices that are secular in nature and voluntary
in application is that they can quickly become religious and non-volun-
tary. To ensure a coach does not use the locker room as a forum for
forced indoctrination would require governmental monitoring of the
prayers. 91 Two major questions asked in Establishment Clause cases is
whether the governmental involvement is excessive; and, whether the
involvement is a continuing one calling for official and continuing sur-
veillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement. 2 The in-
clusion of the state as a religious monitor of the coach's actions will
impermissibly entangle the state with religion.
Due to the fact that any prayer adopted by, led by, or enforced by a
public university athletic coach can run afoul of the First Amendment,
universities have to explore other options to allow team prayer in a-pub-
lic university locker room. To help overcome the potential stigma of a
coach led prayer, the coach could either institute a moment of silence for
pursuing whatever interest the student-athletes might have, casually
mention religion without advocating prayer, or open the locker room
into a public, forum. A coach's strongest argument would ,be the devel-
opment of a moment of silence for pursuing purely secular objectives. If
the coach can prove that no religion was mentioned and the activity was
designed to build team unity, then the practice would not violate the
Establishment Clause.93
A. Silent Prayer
Silent prayers adopted by the students themselves or instituted by the
state for purely secular reasons, can provide the environment where in-
dividual reflection or prayer can thrive in the locker room without impli-
cating the state or the coach in religious activities. Silent prayers that are
sponsored by the government, however, can still violate the Establish-
89. See Weisman, supra note 37.
90. "The [e]stablishment [c]lause focuses on the constitutionality of the state action, not
on the choices made by the complaining individual." Jager, 862 F.2d at 832. See also Engle,
370 U.S. at 430, n.77.
91. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
92. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970), cited in Dayton Christian Schools,
Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n., 766 F. 2d 932, 957 (6th Cir. 1985).
93. See generally Wallace v. Jaffe, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurrence).
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ment Clause. In Wallace v. Jaffe, the Supreme Court held that an Ala-
bama Statute which authorized a one minute period of silence in all
public schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer" was a law respecting
the establishment of religion.94 The statute was struck down because it
did not have a secular purpose and the motivation for passing the statute
was to advance religion.95 To be a valid moment of silence, the practice
has to be adopted with purely secular intentions.96 Some states have
adopted valid moments of silence statues by including in the statutes that
the purpose of the silent moment is to help settle down the students.97
B. Casual Communication
A coach has the inherent right to bring the athletes into a huddle and
ask them to think about what it means to be playing in the game. Noth-
ing in the First Amendment says that a state employee can never use the
word God.98 The coach could also tell the athletes that "through the
grace of God no one will get injured." A statement of this sort, and in
this context, would not be considered religious indoctrination, but rather
a polite remark. While technically there might not be a First Amend-
ment violation from causally mentioning the word God, if a mere men-
tion starts sounding like a prayer, governmental entanglement in having
to monitor the speech could violate the Establishment Clause.
C. Equal Access
If a coach allows a different religious group to pray before each
game, under the equal access theory, this practice could be valid. The
equal access theory has been examined by the Supreme Court in both
the university and high school context. In Widmar v. Vincent, a student
group sued the university for the right to use state facilities for religious
reasons under the free exercise and free speech clauses.99 The Court
concluded that the Establishment Clause does not bar a policy of equal
access for a religious club when university facilities are open to all other
94. Id. at 61.
95. Id. at 56-7.
96. See generally Wallace, 472 U.S. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurrence).
97. See Abington, supra and accompanying text note 73. See also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 71.
98. The coach has to be very careful, even if the name of God is not used, because the
statement still might be considered a religious prayer. Thus the use of the term God is not
dispositive of what constitutes a prayer, rather the idea or intention of the statement is the
controlling factor. See generally Annotation, supra note 74, at 1353, citing De Spain v. De
Kalb County Community Sch. Dist., 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906
(1967).
99. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263.
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student groups.' The Court concluded that if a university creates a fo-
rum generally open for use by student groups, it cannot discriminate
against groups based on the content of their speech.10 1 Thus an "Equal
Access" policy is not incompatible with the Establishment Clause.10 2
In 1984 the Equal Access Act was passed to apply the Widmar hold-
ing to high schools. 1 3 In analyzing the constitutionality of the Equal
Access Act, the Supreme Court in Board of Education of the Westside
Community School v. Mergens upheld the constitutionality of the act
based on the act's requirement that there be, "a limited open forum, the
organization has to be a non-curriculum related group, and state em-
ployees can only attend in a non-participatory capacity."'" The Court
concluded that the high school could allow the religious club to use
school facilities like any other group in the limited open forum. 0 5 The
Court defined a limited open forum as a noncurriculum related student
group that meets on school premises during noninstitutional time.'0 6 In
his concurrence Justice Marshall thought that the plurality's reliance on
Widmar was inappropriate because the university took concrete steps to
disassociate the university's name from the religious program; and for
the religious club in Mergens to be valid, the high school would have to
take similar steps to "fully disassociate" itself from the religious
program. 7
One of the most important aspects of the Supreme Court's decision
in Mergens is the realization that the Religious Clause violation was
brought about by indirect school sponsorship of peer pressure. Justice
O'Connor felt that even though attendance at the meeting was not
mandatory, there still remained the "possibility of student peer pres-
sure."'0 8 The potential for peer pressure, along with the potential neces-
sity for governmental monitoring to ensure equal access, makes the
option of opening the locker room into a public forum less attractive
than silent prayers.
100. Id. at 263. The Court in Lamb's Chapel required all schools to either open their
facilities to the broadest array of groups or to none at all. Lamb's Chapel, 124 L. Ed. 2d at
361-2
101. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70.
102. Id. at 270-75.
103. Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235
(1990).
104, Id. at 233.
105. Id. at 239.
106. Id. at 235.
107. Id. at 266-67.
108. Id. at 251.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Prayer is a topic close to the hearts of most Americans. The majority
might not have any problem with prayers in their children's locker room,
but religious minorities might have a problem with this practice. The
First Amendment was designed to protect these minorities.
Prayer in a public university locker room violates the Establishment
Clause because the prayers take place in a state facility, during a state
activity, and are normally led by a state official. College students are
more mature than high school students, therefore, college students are
less susceptible to peer pressure and more capable of comprehending
that the prayers do not indicate state support for religion. The authorita-
tive position held by the coach and the restraints involved in athletics,
however, does require public universities to provide student-athletes
with a higher level of protection than regular college students. Based on
the current sense of power exhibited by some college athletes, there ap-
pears to exist a new breed of student-athletes willing, and sometimes
eager, to exert their rights through strikes, boycotts, or other actions.
While some college athletes have been able to lash-out against their for-
mer coaches, the majority of student-athletes dare not raise a single ob-
jection to the conduct or actions of their coach or institution.
College athletes are, on a whole, in a rigidly supervised environment
that is controlled by a state agent, therefore, college athletes should have
a level of protection comparable to the protection afforded to middle/
high school students in First Amendment cases. If a team prayer is led,
monitored, or supervised by a coach, the coach's free speech right has to
be suspended to avoid entanglement. However, based on the Weisman
and Jones cases, if there is no state endorsement or entanglement or if
the team prayers are implemented and controlled by the athletes them-
selves without state assistance, the prayers will not violate the Establish-
ment Clause.
Coaches still have at least one Hail Mary left in their arsenal. Prayer
could still be utilized in a public university locker room if the coach
adopts a neutral policy for a moment of silence before a game for indi-
vidual reflection. This practice will be valid as long as all student-ath-
letes are given the option of choosing their own actions during the silent
period.
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